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THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE GOLD COAST AND GHANA
Prologue
No, we do not want to tatch up with
anyone. What we want to do is to go for
ward all the time, night and day, in the'
company of Man and in the company of all
men. The caravan should not be stretched
out, for in that case each line will hardly
see those who preceed it; and men who no
longer recognize each other meet less and
less together, and talk to each other less
(Fanon)
and less.
This essay is a study of the long and painful process of development
of an African economy.

Ghana's pattern of economic growth in this century

is not very different from that of many other underdeveloped countries in
Africa:

the country experienced a period of rapid growth from 1900 to 1925,

followed by a period of stagnation from 1925 to 1945, and another period of
expansion and development following the Second World War.
Cocoa, and to a lesser extent gold, was the main basis for the econ
omic revolution which in the first decades of this century transformed
Ghana from a subsistence ecnnomy to a colonial export economy.

A fall in

ocean transport costs following the application of steam to ocean shipping
at the end of the 19th century drastically shortened the distance between
Ghana and the developed world; while rising income in Europe and America,
and a growing taste for chocolate as an item of mass consumption provided
the market for Ghana's cocoa, and the engine for its economic growth.

Ghana,

a remote agricultural country, became part of a system of international
division of labor whose center was Great Britain.
The beginnings of the growth process in Ghana lie somewhere in the
1880's and 1890 1 s; however, in the early years farmers used the output of
cocoa as seed to plant more cocoa, and the major impact of the increased
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production on foreign trade was felt only after 1900.

Except for the war

years, the period between 1900-1920 was one of very rapid growth - an
annual average of perhaps 10% per year.

This was the '-'opening up"

period of the colonial regime and it lasted until the 1920 1 s.

In the

mid-twenties, the rate of growth slowed down substantially, and for the
next twenty-five years the economy stagnated and even declined because of
the breakdown of international economy during the depression and the war.
After the Second World War, an ext:raordinary boom in cocoa prices
in the early 1950's brought the country unprecedented prosperity and
provided capital and foreign exchange for a large program of government
expenditure designed to provide a basis f-0r modernization and development.
It led to Ghana's "decade of development," 1955 to 1965, under Nkrumah.
At first, this development program was carried out on traditional lines,
but with time an increasingly radical break with the past was attempted,
In some ways this massive effort at development was a second revolution
in the sense that it tried to change the laws of development of the coun
try.

However, it is too early to determine what the lasting effects of

this period were; it set into motion forces that are still being played
out, and it remains a subject of great concern and controversy.
This essay is cast in the form of a dialogue between the government
and the private sector.
on the government.

These are two ~easons to justify the emphasis

First, the government controls many of the ;t,ns-crumental

variables which determ·ine the ·Btructure and J;:pte of gro~A~;. ~f the economy.
Second, the government has often been a conservative force, resisting
adaptation and holding the economy back.
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The government creates the environment of the country by affecting
the degree of economic integration.

It uses its policy instruments to

raise and lower barriers to exchange between the sectors of the economy;
in so doing it redirects economic flows, thereby creating and destroying
trade.

The government plans, constructs and operates the basic transpor

tation and communications system~ the grid it lays down determines the
structure of costs and prices, the degree of mobility of goods and factors,
and the extent of specialization and trade.

Government policy on tariffs

and exchange controls determines the linkages of the country with the inter
national economy.

Its tax policy, its laws, and its control of the finan

cial system channel flows of capital and enterprise; and its expenditure on
health, education, and housing make labour more or less productive and
mobile.

How the government uses its instruments, and the degree to which

it perceives and takes advantage of opportunities for growth and increased
division of labour are therefore critical in determining the evolution of
the economy.
The record of 80Vernment in Ghana is not a very good one.

Its policies

have often been misguided and ineffective and it has exhibited a surprising
degree of inflexibility and rigidity.

It adopted certain broad courses of

action and then failed to adapt to changing circumstances.

Its inability

to correctly interpret signals emanating from its environment and to frame
apµropriate responses have greatly hampered the ability of the Ghanaian
economy to remain alive and grow through the eJcigencies of the world economy.
A feedback relationship exists between the government sector and the
private sector:

the mistakes of the government quickly reflect back on its
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ability to finance itself and survive.

This interrelationship has been a

critical factor in the dynamics of the Ghanaian economy.

In Ghana the

government finances its expenditure through taxes on imports and exports,
and therefore the amount

ot revenue available to the government depends on

the rate at which foreign trade grows.

When government expenditure fails

to stimulate growth in the value of exports, its revenue ceases to grow and
its expansion must come to a halt.
economic history.

This is a recurrent theme in Ghanaian

In addition the government sector requires certain inputs

from the private sector for its effective functioning and it cannot expand
if they are not forthcoming.

In several instances the government iu Ghana

has not been able to expand as fast as it wished because there was a short
age of skilled labor and imported materials, or because wages rose due to
inadequacies in food production, transportation, and distribution.

These

shortages, in turn, can be traced to the failures of the government in ex
panding human capital formation and infrastructure sufficiently and effec
tively.
The approach of this essay is historical.

History hangs heavy on

Ghana and to see its present problems requires a long look backwards. For
most of the twentieth century, Ghana was a colony of Great Britain and its
laws of economic motion were derived from abroad.

Ghana received capital,

technology, and markets because of her close linkages to Great Britain.
The country also inherited specific political and legal institutions and a
particular political economy.

We cannot understand Ghana's predicament

without studying the ways in which British colonial administration attempted
to promote development and improve welfare, the instruments they had avail
able to them, and the ends they pursued.

The nature of yesterday's rulers

- 5 determines the nature of today's problems.
The British colonial administrators came to the Gold Coast with their
own special set of ideas and tools for dealing with the colony's economic
problems.

Their principles of political economy, deeply rooted in English

classical economics and English economic problems, played a strategic role
in determining the course of development the Gold Coast would take.

The

British did not initiate growth in the Gold Coast, nor were they the driv
ing force of development, but they greatly shaped its impact, and their
ideas~ both when they were right and when they were wrong, have continued
to guide policy makers to the present day.
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Part .1:

The Gold Coast
I

The British had been active in the Gold Coast to some extent from 1600,
but the idea of exerting direct control through the British colonial appara
tus took hold only late in the 19th century.

Before the 1D70's the British

government used its mercantile power to foster British traders, but it tried
to avoid direct administrative responsibility for the Gold Coast and the
entanglements of colonial rule.
At the beginning of the nineteenth century the British had only a
precarious base on the coast, which they shared with several other European
countries.

Inland, the Ashanti governed an economic and political empire

which, at its peak, covered an area larger than that of Ghana today.

This

empire had as its economic base a northern trade with other African nations,
including a long distance trade with North Africa:.. across the Sahara, and
southern trade with Europe by sea.

The British sent envoys inland to try to

negotiate a commercial treaty with Ashanti early in the century, and in 1820
had

(for about a year) a resident consul in Kumasi, the Ashanti capital.

These efforts did not succeed and relations between the British and Ashanti
during the nineteenth century were tenuous.
However, the British remained on the Coast, policy vacillated between
greater involvement and complete withdrawal, and there was a gradual in
crease in the

11

string of settlements on the seashore."

As the British econ

omy grew following the Industrial Revolution, it became the predominant
coastal power, and one by one l:ought out other countries which had established
themselves there.
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The British did not control land outside their forts, but they formed
alliances with coastal African nations and helped them to assert greater
independence vis-a-vis Ashanti.

This caused continual friction with Ashanti

and resulted in a series of wars.
In 1852, Disraeli declared that

11

the colonies are millstones round our

nectn~ and in 1865, the House of Connnons, in a resolution which surely ranks
as one of the worst predictions in the history of the empire, declared the
end to British expansion in West Africa, and foresaw ultimate withdrawal.
few years later, around 1870, economic interest in West Africa

began to

grow rapidly as all of Europe looked outward toward the third world.
British

A

The

increased control in the sections of the country they administered

(the southern part of what is now Ghana was established as the Gold Coast
Colony in 1874), and reversed the policy of African advancement by substi
tuting English officials for local authorities.

Conflict with Ashanti in

creased, and in a final show-down the British defeated it through military
conquest.

In 1901, Kumasi was captured and nearly all of present-day Ghana

became part of the British empire.
Once direct responsibility was established, the colonial administrators
were faced with the problem of administering and, in some sense, developing
the newly-acquired colony.

They did not view development with the sense of

urgency we now have, but they saw the Gold Coast as an underdeveloped coun
try, ("The soil is everywhere fertile and the needs of the people being
few, there is little incentive to work. 11 ) and had a plan for bringing about
"improved methods and new manners."
British strategy was outward-looking with regard to capital, enterpris
ing, and markets.

In their view, Africa had a plentiful (though not always
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willing) supply of labour, and rich natural resources which could find a
ready market in the developed world.

Capital and enterprise were all that

was lacking, and the task of the government was to rnake it possible to
acquire these from abroad.

The colonies were regarded ,:as being in the

condition of undeveloped estates and estates which can never be developed
without imperial assistance. '

The Gold Coast and Great Britain were com-

plementary; the role of the state was to break dm,m barriers to exchange
between the colony and the home government by providing basic services and
a favorable climate for foreign investment.

This approach led the British

to overstress foreign markets and foreign capital, and to neglect internal
markets and indigenous enterprise.

Instead of protecting local business,

they brought about free trade and provided a helping hand to foreign enter
prises.
Within this framework, British policy was effectively laissez-faire
in the sense that the role of the state was severely limited with regard to
both goals and instruments.

The state acted as a catalyst by providing

infrastructure and services, but relied mainly on private initiative to
advance economic development.
Fiscal and monetary policies were very restricted.

In the British

system each colony had to pay its way (the surest evidence of the soundness
of measures for the improvement of an uncivilized people was that they
should be self-supporting).

The colonial government had to balance its

budget unless it could borrow abroad on commercial principles: i.e., it
had to satisfy private lenders of the soundness of the loan and its ability
to repay it.

The Gold Coast could, and did borrow in London from time to
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time; but in fact, through most of its history its long-term borrowing fell
short of its international reserves 9 and it was a net creditor of the Connnon
wealth.

The government had little scope for capital formation with long

gestation periods or uncertain returns;

returns had to be quick in order to

service the debt.
Monetary policy in the colonies was extremely conservative.

The stock

of money held by the private sector for transaction purposes and as a store
of wealth increased steadily as the economy became commercialized.

However,

the government did not ha.ve the right to issue currency, and therefore, it
could not use private savings in monetary assets to finance a deficit.

The

functions of a central bank were the responsibility of the West African
Currency Board, whose policy it was to keep reserves amounting at times to
over 100 percent of the money supply invested in London.
Even if the colonial service had wanted to do more to promote develop
ment it was politically constrained from any dramatic action.
alien government without
no political power.

a.

It was an

poli;:ic.s.l base in the colony, and therefore, with

It could rule only if matters proceeded smoothly and

no disturbing elements were introduced into the existing political scene.
The colonial service was actually not a government at all, but a committee
to manage the affairs of the colony.

Consequently, it was never able to

mobilize widespread support for large scale efforts toward development.
In addition, personnel was often in short supply:
bution of

11

the British contri

orderli' administration to the colony was accomplished with only

a few hundred persons.

The number of Englishmen wishing to serve in the

colonies was limited, and Africans were barred from the service for practical
reasons because of the adoption by the British of a unified colonial service
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system.

Because of the inflexibility of the system, the government, even

when funds were available in periods of great prosperity, could not expand
personnel rapidly enough to carry out elaborate programs.
This introduced an element of paternalism and anti-commercialism into
the colonies in contradiction to the laissez-faire ideology of the Imperial
System.

Colonial officers we.re not drm,m from the most dynamic and able

sectors of the British economy.

Many were displaced landed gentry who had

resisted economic change in Great Britain, and tended to carry abroad with
them their opposition to radical innovation.

There was also a tendency

toward sluggishness in the colonial services which was reinforced by the
colonial office's bureaucratic traditions of over-reliance on written reports
and adherence to precedent, both of which precluded strong or determined
policies.

In addition, cultural obstacles hindered the effectiveness of the

European colonial officers.

Acutely conscious of their position as tres

passers, they were often cautious and afraid, while racial prejudices often
hampered their ability to understand the problems of the colony.

The

officers in the colonial service were not dealing with farmers, traders, or
lawyers, but with the African, the native, the local inhabitant.

This cul

tural gap magnified the political and bureaucratic problems involved in
carrying out development tasks efficiently or effectively.
Thus, there was a conflict between the abstract goals of the empire and
the realities of colonial administration; the anti-commercialism of colonial
officials in the Gold Coast was often at cross purposes with the trade-creating
goals of the British imperial system.

The empire commanded men to specialize

but the colonial administration, grounded in the feudal virtues of self-reliance
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and self-sufficiency acted as a brake on specialization and integration
into the world economy.

The colonial government was not a dynamic force.

The chief concern of colonial administrators was to show the home govern
ment that they were paying their

O't-m

way, and to convince local merchants

and indigenous leaders that they did not interfere in local affairs.

This

system could work only if Adam Smith were correct in assuming that ' 1little
else is required to carry a state to the highest degree of opulence from
the lowest state of barbarianism, but peace, easy taxes, and a tolerable
administration of justice.
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1900 - 1920
The first development
around 1900.

11

plan 1 ; for the Gold Coast was put into effect

It was not a plan in the modern sense of the word, but a

government program designed much as are the plans of today.
was to develop the country by following the three R1 s:
Railways, and Ross's medical achievements.

Its strategy

Rule of the British,

The program was short and

modest and, on the surface at least, highly successful.

The main thrust

of the plan lay in the construction of a railway and in the pacification of
the country.

The government did not have sufficient revenue at the time

to finance the entire program, but made up the deficit by issuing bonds in
the London capital market.

The construction of a railway began in 1898

and it reached Kumasi in 1903.

The Ashanti were pacified in 1901; a beginning

was made toward enlarging the administrative structure; and in 1904 the public
debt stood at over two million pounds.
Exports rose rapidly in the two decades that followed and the rest of
the economy expanded with the rise in exports.
pari passu;

Government revenue rose

the government could easily pay interest and amortization on

.its debt and still have a large surplus at its disposal for the steady and
continuous expansion of government services and infra-structure.

Revenue

at times rose faster than the government 1 s capacity to spend and, at one
point, taxes were reduced because of excess revenue.
Government performance between 1900 and 1920 was a model of colonial
financial strategy.

The government was satisfied with the country's re

markable progress and prosperity, and pleased that
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•.. the general increase in wealth are
being followed, not merely by better
living and better houses but also by
an increased intelligence and enlight
enment as well as by an excess of indus
try and thrift,
The government was particularly pleased with the success in Ashanti,
the major focus of interest, and welcomed the prosperity in that area on
political as well as on economic grounds.

It gave the "Ashanti greater

opportunity of spending money and a corresponding increase in their desire
to earn it, ii and in the government's view, if the Ashanti could be encour-·
aged to invest his money in commerce and farming, the government could
11

fully rely upon his common sense not to risk his possessions in the future

by fruitless quarrels with either

the 3overnment or his fellows.•'

Kl.llllasi grew rapidly during this period.
the city, and new migrants settled there.

Former residents returned to

Trade expanded and leading

connnercial firms established branches in the city.

Buildings sprang up,

which were "erected and m,med by leading Ashanti chiefs and leased to
mercantile firms",

1
and the administraiton applauded this ' connnendable

enterprise in building operations".

Kumasi became again a distribution

center for the whole of Ashanti and the hinterland.

Old trading links

were revived and new ones created as rubber, cocoa, and the railroad pro
In 1908, the colonial administra

vided a basis for the city's growth.
tion could claim with satisfaction:

Wi th a plentiful food supply, high

11

prices for his produce and high wages for his labour, the Ashanti is
commencing to appreciate the values of peace and political security."

- 13a The satisfaction the government took in the prosperity of the Gold
Coast was by no means entirely justified; it is not clear that the govern
ment's contribution to the growth process was an essential, or even an
important, factor.

Many of the government's policies were misguided and

perhaps counter-productive.

The government emphasized foreign investment

in the gold industry, which was dominated by Europeans, in its development
strategy; but it was African enterprise in cocoa which accounted for the
prosperity of the colony, and it received little help, and a certain amount
of hindrance from the government.

It could be said that, in a sense, the

cocoa industry grew in spite of, rather than because of, government policies.
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(2)

The Gold Industry
The country had a long history as a gold producer ~ traveler s and soldiers

visiting Ashanti had long before brought back visions of fabulous lJealth.
The gold mines had been in operatio n since at least the early 16th century ,
but indigeno us methods had reached an impasse because of their ineffec tive
ness in working deep mines and modern machine ry was necessar y for further
developm ent.

This is a classic example of the colonia l view:

here was a

rich raw materia l, much in deme.nd in world markets , lacking the entrepre neur-
ship and capital that only European s could bring.
Government aid was essentia l in getting the 80ld industry on its feet.
Even though some rich gold mines were located relative ly near the coast~ it
was exceedin gly difficu lt and costly to transpo rt machine ry by means of
headloa ding.

It was the absence of a railroad that caused the efforts by

European s to establis h a gold mining industry in the later 1870's and early
1880 1 s to fail.

The European industry became success ful only after the

complet ion of the railroad in 1903.

Pedler has called the gold mines "The

11
Father of the Railways , because the decision to build in the West in 1898

was no:·doub t in large part due to the fact that the gold mines were located
in this region.
The governm ent of the Gold Coast helped the gold industry somewhat in
obtainin g adequate supplies of labour but not to, the extent that was usual
in colonia l Africa.

Most colonia l governm ents did not believe in laissez

faire where labour was concerne d.

Instead, they regarded it an essenti al

governm ent function to interfer e in the labour market to assure an adequate
labour supply for the export sector of the economy.

The economic rationa le

I

!

- 15 for this policy was the theory of the backward- bending supply curve of labour.
It was argued that because of the economic backwardn ess and limited horizons
of the indigenou s populatio n, the supply curve was highly inelastic and
probably negativel y, rather than positivel y, sloped (at least in the short
run until new tastes were acquired) .

An outward shift of demB.t1.d for labour

brought about by an inflow of foreign capital would, it was felt, cause a
rise in wages, but a decline in the amount of labour supplied.

To overcome

this problem, a policy was advocated that would hold wages down to nreason
able'' levels and shift the supply curve outward.

In many parts of Africa

poll taxes, land appropria tion, and other coercive measures were used to
force the indigenou s populatio n to leave the tradition al sectors and work
in the new European sectors of the economy.

In some cases it was even con··

sidered necessary to import labour from India and China to make up for the
labour deficit in Africa,
The colonial governmen t of the Gold Coast began with the usual view
(the country suffers from a dearthof labour to which the character of the
inhabita~ ts largely contribut es), but it did not in fact take the strong
measures of other colonial governme nts, and in this respect the Gold Coast
policy constitut ed a deviation from the norm of colonial political economy.
At the turn of the century the demands of the mining industry, railway
construct ion, and the cocoa industry caused a shortage of labour.

The

Transport Departmen t was establish ed with the goal of alleviatin g the short
age.

In his first report, the head of the departmen t described his func

tions as follows:
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The object of the department in its original con
ception was to obtain control of the labour market so as to keep down the rate of wages, and for
this reason the department has not failed in its
object. This has not, however, been accomplished
without great difficulty, and at one moment I feared
could not be successfully carried through, the
chief obstacle having been the in.discriminate way
in which mining agents have raised wages.
This effort, however, was shortlived, and the Transport Department was disbanded by 1909.
The government, at one time, considered importing Asian labourers to
the Gold Coast, but only a small number were brought in.

The government

also helped the gold industry in its inland recruiting ventures by arranging
meetings between recruiters and chiefs, but gave little more than its good
offices.

Although the gold miners desired greater support from the govern

ment, colonial administrators refused to use the powers of coercion and
compulsion at their disposal in order to increase the labour supply.

The

government described its policy in the 1937 handbook by saying that it
•.• declines to exert any form of compulsion what
ever in recruiting; its officers assist recruiting
agents by every means in their power 11 going so far
as greatly to increase their own work in doing so.
Finally, it has placed a strict limit on the num
ber of men it employs in railway and harbour con
struction •.•
The government did not impose poll taxes, nor did it permit contract labour;
to some extent it defended labour from gross abuse.
The reason the government did not do more to helu foreign enterprise
was that it had only limited political control of the colony, and therefore
did not have the power to control the labour market.

The administration of

- 17 the Gold Coast colony was not ambitious, and had a dual attitude toward for
eign capital:

it welcomed and encouraged foreigr. capital, but resented the

difficulties it created for smooth administration in the colony.

In the 19th

century, government attempts to institute a poll tax had met with stiff re
sistance, and the government did not wish to raise the issue again unless it
was forced to.

The colony was prospering because of the rapid expansion of

cocoa and the labour problems of the African sector cf the economy were out
side of the government's horizons.

The colonial administration was relieved

of pressure to act on labour problems.
The returns to the colony from the sunl)ort of the gold industry were
quite small.

Gold production expanded rapidly for only a. short while. and

in the 1920 1 s the industry declined.

The

11

returnecl value'· of the gold in

dustry to the country was small because the share of wag-es an.d taxes w~1_s
low, while the share of imports of raw materials and equipment were high,
as were profits remitted from abroad.

The gold industry had few linkages

with the rest of the economy and spill-over to other sectors was short.

On

balance the gold industry may even have been a net loss to the country be
cause it continuously absorbed a disproportionate share of government atten-·
tion, and may have diverted resources which could have been used more produc
tively elsewhere.
One of the most important aspects of the colonial government's gold
policy is exceedingly difficult to evaluate; namely, the effect of coloniza-
tion on the terms and conditions on which caryital and technology were in
ducted into the Gold Coast.

It is not possible to analyze what might have

happened had there been no colonization, but three points should be noted:

- 18 (1)

The best gold fields had been discovered and worked by Africans.

Europeans played but a small role in the discovery of the gold mines, which
were originally brought to their attention by African middlemen, who knew
the potential of the mines and recognized the need for modernization of
production.
(2)

Europeans had acquired mineral rights very cheaply since they

negotiated directly with local chiefs whose bargaining power was weak. This
would not have been possible had the Ashanti empire remained intact.

The

empire had so closely guarded its source of wealth that no European or for
eigner had been allowed to see a gold mine, and the gold industry was
dominated by a small ruling elite who appropriated its surplus.
(3)

Uninhibited free enterprise was extraordinarily inefficient in

raising capital for the gold mining industry.

The mad scramble for gold

concessions in the Jungle Boom, between 1898 and 1901, was not stimulated
by careful, rational evaluation; rather it was characterized by psychological
reactions bordering on hysteria.

Consequently, the rush for gold was waste

ful in the extreme; although the burden, in the beginning at least, fell
mainly on the British and not on Ghana.

Frankel gives an excellent graphic

description of the period,
The potentialities of the field were introduced
to Europe in the usual fashion, that is, by an
exaggerated,quite unwarranted, and soon exploded
boom in the shares of innumerable companies
t,1hose prospectuses portrayed a new Witwatersrand .••
It has been estimated that 321 companies were
registered up to June 1901, with a total nominal
capital of over 25 millions, of which possibly 15
millions was issued···There is no clear indication
of the exact purpose for which, or the exact geo
graphical area in which these companies were in-
tended to, or did in fact, operate. There is no
doubt bhat much of the issued capital was never

- 19 spent anywhere near Hest Africa in general or
the Gold Coast in particular. In fact, not
withstanding the repeated West African mining
booms and the considerable speculation in the
shares of these companies, it is highly signi
ficant that in 1904 there were only some 13 com
panies which could report any gold production
at all, and of these 13, there were only 4 who
returned an output worth more than 10,000 pounds.
(b)

The Cocoa Industry
Cocoa, not gold, was the pole de croissance of the Gold Coast economy.

The industry was developed by African capital, African enterprise, and
African technology, with little help from the colonial government.

The

cocoa industry had begun on its own to a considerable extent before 1900,
and was well-developed by 1910.

Only when the industry was past the ··take

off11 point did the government begin to pay attention to the industry and
plough back some of its earning into it.

The contribution of cocoa to the

government, in the fonn of expanded trade and increased revenue, was com
pletely

out of proportion to the contribution of the government to the

industry.
Because the government did not foresee the potential of the cocoa sec
tor of the economy, the transpottation system it developed in the early years
of colonization was of little help to the industry.

The railroad was located

in the West, while the cocoa industry was developed in the East.

Only after

the eastern link was established in 1912 (the construction of the Accra line
was begun in 1909) was a major share of cocoa exports transported by rail.
Even after the railroads were com~leted, the major part of the journey from
the fann to the port took place by means of a costly headloading system, on
paths and roads built with little government help ot knowledge.
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As the development of cocoa proceeded, the colonial officers, especially
those connected with agriculture, tended to deplore the tendencies to nover
extention11,

11

imprudence 11 , and the "neglect of other crops" instead of ap

plauding the rapid growth of the industry.

Reports from various parts of the

Gold Coast and the Agriculture Department continually complain about the small
farmer who does not "fully realize his responsibility;;, who only "dimly under
stands the measures he has been advised to adopt 11 , who is amore concerned
11
with the money to be made out of his farm than the quality of his produce •

1
The reports repeatedly describe the "dangerous tendenciesn, :wanton neglect",

and "dilatory habitsc. of the African cocoa farmer.
The Agriculture Department of the Gold Coast Colony was particularly
concerned with three facets of the cocoa industry:

the choice of production

techniques, quality control, and over-specialization.

We may deal with each

in turn.
African farmers modified traditional methods of agriculture to suit
the growing of cocoa.

To save on labour, they avoided extensive weeding,

cleaning, or care of land.

It was common practice to grow several crops

on a given plot of land, partly to maintain the fertility of the soil and
partly to provide needed cover crops to protect cocoa from sunlight.

Both

of these practices led to an "'unkempt" appearance of the farms in the eyes
of the Europeans.

To the agricultural officers of the colonial service,

the results seemed shocking; they thought.that far less time should be devoted
to bringing more land under cultivation and far more to tending existing
farms.

The agricultural officers were particularly distraught by what they

thought was a lack of proper disease control.

It was the practice of African
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it.

This practice worked quite well since farms usually recovered by

themselve s, but the governmen t felt it was not in accord with "soundn agri
cultural principle s.
To remedy the alleged deficienc ies, the Agricultu re Departmen t wanted
to be empowered to forbid planting when farms were not kept up to its set
standards .

In addition, the Agricultu re Departmen t attempted to introduce

European plantatio ns to the Gold Coast in order to demonstra te the proper
use of soils.

It also establish ed

11

model 11 farms in various parts of the

colony, but in general they failed to arouse interest among African farmers,
and were indiffere ntly kept.

The governmen t was quite mistaken in its view

of what constitut ed appropria te technique for planting in the Gold Coast;
to this day no method economic ally superior to that developed indigenou sly
has been found.

The European plantatio ns, with agricultu ral methods unsuited

to the condition s found in the Gold Coast, found themselve s unable to com
pete with local producers .
The main point, however, is not that the colonial administr ation was
wrong on the specifics of the technolog ical requireme nts in agricultu re,
but that it had a serious misconcep tion of agricultu ral problems in a tropical
context.

Colonial officers misjudged African ability in general, and auto

matically assumed that African technique s were inferior to the technique s of
Europeans .

Because it was felt that technolog y was easily transferr able from

abroad, little research was done on local problems, and emphasis was placed
on dissemina ting known technique s
applicab ility

to local condition s.

imported from abroad without testing their
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illustrate the anti-commercialism of the agricultural officers.

In both

cases the African farmer was blamed for being too connnercial, i.e., for
following too closely the dictates of the market.

With regard to quality,

the Agriculture Department of the Gold Coast colonial government held
views opposed to those of both the farmers and the merchants.

The Depart

ment wanted the farmers to use better methods of processing the cocoa product
in order to improve the quality and purity of the export crop.

They also

wanted the merchants to help them bring this about by paying higher premiums
for higher-quality cocoa, thus providing aneconomic incentive to the farmer.
The difficulty was that merchants were satisfied with existing quality and
refused to pay premiums for the quality differentials as established by the
Department.

Since neither the farmers nor the merchants complied adequately

with the Department's wishes, the Department sought - and to some extent
achieved - ordinances to enforce its point of view.
The third area of concern was over-specialization.

The Agriculture De

partment felt that cocoa farmers neglected food crops and other export
possibilities; to the colonial administration over-specialization implied
long-run dangers.

The fear of being ,a single crop economy rested, in part,

on the belief that cocoa expansion would create domestic food shortages. This
fear was largely unfounded:

food growing is complementary to cocoa produc

tion, as certain food crops which serve as cover are a by-product of cocoa
planting, while others

require labour in the seasons when cocoa does not.

The argument for diversification also rested on the fear of over
specialization in export crops.

The premises advanced were sound:

r-

the demand
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prices were highly unstable.

The conclusio n that the Gold Coast should

diversify into other export crops did not necessari ly follow from these prem
ises, however.

Individua l primary-p roduct price changes are often similar

during major cyclical swings, and the demand growth and price trend for cocoa
have been at least as satisfact ory as for the typical tropical agricultu ral
product over the period 1900-1965 .

In this context, the case for diversifi ca

1
tion is no clearer in retrospec t than it was in the 1920 s when demand in

creased and prices fluctuate d erratical ly.
The attempt at diversifi cation would have been justified had new major
cash crops been found.

However, when the Agricultu re Departmen t made what

it thought to be a considera ble effort to stimulate other crops and to at
tract European plantatio ns, it had little success.

Hore money was to be made

in cocoa, and African farmers naturally devoted more attention to this
crop than to any other; it was idle to expect them to switch to crops which
were less profitabl e.

Returns to both labour and capital for other crops

were simply not commensu rate with those available in cocoa.
An argument for diversifi cation could still be made on the grounds of

uncertain ty and instabili ty.

The solution to these problems that is most

compatibl e with growth is an insurance scheme which encourage s specializ a
tion by protectin g the specializ ed sub-compo nents of the economy against
the risk of price declines.

One such device is the federal budget, which

redistrib utes income in the economy in such a way as to make sure that no
sector suffers too greatly from participa ting in a wider system of division
of labour.

To achieve this type of harmoniz ation, political cooperati on

among the specializ ed

units is necessary , and it was precisely this that
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the British had at their disposal on an Imperial basis.

The British could

have coordinated production of individual colonies on a global basis; they
could have used their political power to achieve diversification on an
Imperial scale while assuring security for each participant.

Ironically,

the main potential advantage of the British Imperial Trading System was
never utilized.

The empire remained decentralized, and each colony was

responsible mainly for itself.

Colonial administrators encouraged diversi

fication within each colony, and the home government did not make any
attempt to achieve specialization to obtain comparative advantage and diver
sification in the empire as a whole.

In the Gold Coast the government

attempted to curtail the production of cocoa, and encouraged the production
of rubber in its place; in Malaya, whose most profitable product is rubber,
the British administration attempted to expand the production of cocoa.
In summary, we may conclude that although the colonial government did
little to help the African farmer, it did little harm to indigenous industry
because the recommendations of the Agriculture Department were largely ig
nored.

Had the Department's views prevailed, the growth of the Gold Coast

might have been seriously curtailed.
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1920 - 1945
The Guggisberg Ten Year Development Plan (1920-1930) was in many ways
the finest hour of British colonial administration in the Gold Coast.

It

was large, bold, and based on a well articulated theory of development. The
colony had just experienced twenty years of extraordinary growth, and the
year 1920 saw an unprecedented boom which wiped out the depression suffered
by the colonies during the latter part of World War I.

The economic revolu

tion during the previous twenty or thirty years was thought to be only the
beginning.

The country was pro~perous and the government, due to its large

revenues, was financially sound

with a good credit rating in London.

The

problem as Guggisberg saw it was to use the first stage of development to
build a strong foundation for future growth.
His economic principles were as follows:
(a) Long-run economic growth and development of the colony would require
a iarge expenditure by the government in health, in education, and other
fonns of what we call human capital formation, and he considered civilization.
(b) The government's -resources, though substantial a,t the time, were . nonetheless limited compared to the needs of the country and the first
priority was to raise revenue.
(c)

The bulk of the plan would therefore be devoted to improving infra

structure in order to increase exports and thus government revenue and over
all prosperity.
(d)

To prepare for the time when more ample resources would be avail

able, a beginning was made on a new program of education and health. Major

- 26 efforts were postponed until the second stage of the plan when it was hoped
that increased revenue would be available.

Guggisberg stated these princi

ples succinctly:
For Progress we must have Education; for Education
of the right type we must have a bigger revenue. To
get bigger revenue we must have a bigger trade, and
to get a bigger trade we must have more agriculture
and far better systems of transportation than at
present e~ds t.
The basic data for the period 1920-1945 are shown in Figure 2.

There

is a large increase in government expenditure and public debt, a large
expansion of infrastructure (miles of railroad, roads, the opening up of
new ports, etc.), and an expansion in school involvement and health facilities.
Guggisberg's great leap

Figure 2 also shows where the plan failed.

forward was followed by the retrenchment of the great depression and the war.
Exports failed to rise and indeed fell in real value due to falling prices
in the 30's and rising import prices in the 40's.
fulfilled completely due to a lack of revenue.

The plan itself was never

In the 30's there was a re

trenchnent of current expenditures as well, and during the war imports fell
to an unprecedented low.
There is a certain irony in this sequence.

The plan was conceived and

executed by foreigners who felt that the best interest of the Gold Coast re
quired that it turn outward toward the world economy.

As the plan was

being put into effect, the world£conomy collapsed and the Gold Coast's
economy faltered with it.
Part of the trouble was that the British government did not act to
maintain a high level of aggregate activity throughout the empire.

For

example, had the United Kingdom expanded foreign investment to the colonies
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during this period, it would have solved its own problems of depression as
well as the growth problems of the colonies.

However, it was unable to take

the necessary steps, and instead transmitted the full impact of the world
crisis to its colonies.
It is interesting to note that the failure of the plan did not result
in a political upheaval.

There were crisis (the cocoa boycott, for example)

but political control and stability were maintained even during the great
stresses of the war when imports fell.

In the postwar period, a very different

political system led to a very different outcome, when the economic pattern
of 1920-1945 repeated itself.

IV
We may briefly summarize some major conclusions that emerge from this
condensed and simplified examination of British colonial policy and its
effects in the Gold Coast between 1900 and 1945.
1.

Foreign investment proved to be a poor engine of growth.

Although

foreign investment was welcomed its contribution to the economy was very
limited.
2.

The major dynamic for growth came from the African sector of the

economy and it achieved its success with little help from the government, or
from foreign capital and technology.
3.

Despite the great success of the African sector in establishing

Ghana as the leading producer of cocoa in the world and successfully main
taining its share in the face of competition from equally fertile areas
elsewhere,

(including some in which cocoa is grown on a European Plantation

basis), African businessmen were not able to diversify into manufacturing
or large scale modern farming.

Ghana remained a nation of small farmers and

traders selling unfinished products on the international market.
4.

The international economy proved highly unreliable and unstable as

a foundation on which to build the economy.
5.

The productivity of the government sector was low.

It made import

ant errors in planning the transport system; it failed to do adequate research;
it underestimated the strength and needs of the African sector; and it over
stressed the importance of foreign trade and foreign capital.

The government

created linkages with the mother country, but decreased them with neighboring
African countries, and failed to improve internal linkages within the economy.
6.

The government also proved to be rigid and inflexible rather than

enterprising.

It did not actively seek out new opportunities to anywhere near

the extent possible and when its strategy failed, it retrenched rather than
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make attempts to change its course.

The governmen t was a reluctant and

gradual moderniz er, and at times atavistic and entrenche d in feudal values.
The British brought some of the benefits of industria l progress to Ghana;
they also used Ghana as an outlet for the tensions and problems of British
society.

Contrary to what is often claimed, the credit for opening up the

country cannot be given to the British colonial administr ation; and as we
shall see in the next section, when the administr ation departed in 1957, it
left behind a meagre heritage.

